RFC 3723 specifies IPsec requirements for block storage protocols over IP (e
1. Introduction [RFC3723] specifies IPsec requirements for block storage protocols over IP (e.g., iSCSI [RFC3720] ) based on IPsec v2 ( [RFC2401] and related RFCs); those requirements have subsequently been applied to remote direct data placement protocols, e.g., RDMAP [RFC5040] . This document updates RFC 3723's IPsec requirements to IPsec v3 ( [RFC4301] and related RFCs) to reflect developments since RFC 3723 was published.
For brevity, this document uses the term "block storage protocols" to refer to all protocols to which RFC 3723's requirements apply; see Section 1.3 for details.
In addition to the IPsec v2 requirements in RFC 3723, IPsec v3, as specified in [RFC4301] and related RFCs (e.g., IKEv2 [RFC5996] ), SHOULD be implemented for block storage protocols. Retention of the mandatory requirement for IPsec v2 provides interoperability with existing implementations, and the strong recommendation for IPsec v3 encourages implementers to move forward to that newer version of IPsec.
Cryptographic developments since the publication of RFC 3723 necessitate changes to the encryption transform requirements for IPsec v2, as explained further in Section 2.2; these updated requirements also apply to IPsec v3.
Block storage protocols can be expected to operate at high data rates (multiple gigabits/second). The cryptographic requirements in this document are strongly influenced by that expectation; an important example is that Triple Data Encryption Standard Cipher Block Chaining (3DES CBC) is no longer recommended for block storage protocols due to the frequent rekeying impacts of 3DES's 64-bit block size at high data rates.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in The rationale for the added requirement is that GMAC is more amenable to hardware implementations that may be preferable for the high data rates at which block storage protocols can be expected to operate. The requirement for 3DES CBC has become problematic due to 3DES's 64-bit block size; i.e., the core cipher encrypts or decrypts 64 bits at a time. Security weaknesses in encryption start to appear as the amount of data encrypted under a single key approaches the birthday bound of 32 GiB (gibibytes) for a cipher with a 64-bit block size; see Appendix A and [triple-des-birthday]. It is prudent to rekey well before that bound is reached, and 32 GiB or some significant fraction thereof is less than the amount of data that a block storage protocol may transfer in a single session. This may require frequent rekeying, e.g., to obtain an order-of-magnitude (10x) safety margin by rekeying after 3 GiB on a multi-gigabit/sec link. In contrast, AES has a 128-bit block size, which results in a much larger birthday bound (2^68 bytes); see Appendix A. AES CBC [RFC3602] is the primary mandatory-to-implement encryption transform for interoperability and hence is the appropriate mandatory-to-implement transform replacement for 3DES CBC.
AES in Counter mode (AES CTR) is no longer the encryption transform that is most amenable to hardware implementation. That characterization now applies to AES GCM [RFC4106] , which provides both encryption and integrity protection in a single cryptographic When IPsec is used, the receipt of an IKEv1 Phase 2 delete message or an IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL exchange that deletes the SA SHOULD NOT be interpreted as a reason for tearing down the block storage protocol connection (e.g., TCP-based). If additional traffic is sent, a new SA will be created to protect that traffic.
The method used to determine whether a block storage protocol connection should be established using IPsec is regarded as an issue of IPsec policy administration and thus is not defined in this document. The method used by an implementation that supports both IPsec v2 and v3 to determine which versions of IPsec are supported by a block storage protocol peer is also regarded as an issue of IPsec policy administration and thus is also not defined in this document. If both IPsec v2 and v3 are supported by both endpoints of a block storage protocol connection, the use of IPsec v3 is RECOMMENDED. Of particular interest are the security considerations concerning the use of AES GCM [RFC4106] and AES GMAC [RFC4543] ; both modes are vulnerable to catastrophic forgery attacks if a nonce is ever repeated with a given key.
The requirement level for 3DES CBC has been reduced, based on considerations for high-speed implementations; 3DES CBC remains an optional encryption transform that may be suitable for implementations limited to operating at lower speeds where the required rekeying frequency for 3DES is acceptable.
The requirement level for AES CTR has been reduced, based solely on hardware implementation considerations that favor AES GCM, as opposed to changes in AES CTR's security properties. AES CTR remains an optional security transform that is suitable for use in general, as it does not share 3DES CBC's requirement for frequent rekeying when operating at high data rates.
Key sizes with comparable strength SHOULD be used for the cryptographic algorithms and transforms for any individual IPsec security association. See Section 5.6 of [SP800-57] for further discussion.
